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The stage of worship
Iwas born in 1951 and came of age inthe Mao Zedong Era. Mao worshipwas not a mental phenomenon
unique to me, but was common to all in
my generation. From primary to second-
ary school, the education I received and
the discourse that influenced me were
bathed in the halo of Mao’s glamour. I
was surrounded by news and artistic
messages crafted according to Mao’s
value system. In the classroom, correct
answers were determined by Mao’s
views. Mao was on a higher plane than
parents and teachers. The cumulative effect of all of this made its mark on
the impressionable youth that I was.
I turned 15 the year that the Cultural Revolution began. Propaganda de-
voted to Mao as an individual intensified. If it is said that Mao and the Com-
munist Party were equally sacred prior to the Cultural Revolution, Mao
gained pre-eminence over the Communist Party once the Cultural Revolu-
tion began. As internal Party struggles became more acute, the Party’s top
leaders and major portions of the leadership ranks at every level became
targets of revolutionary struggle as factions of counterrevolutionary revi-
sionists and capitalist roaders. Young people have asked me, How did you
feel at the time? I respond truthfully, When the Cultural Revolution began,
I was galvanised. A 15-year-old high school student was suddenly liberated
from the classroom and spent his days reading all kinds of big character
posters exposing problems with the leadership that no one had ever heard
of before. It genuinely aroused heartfelt admiration for Mao’s prescience in
ferreting out China’s revisionist peril. Although my family did not belong to
any of the Five Red Categories, (1) and I was soon cut down to size in the
great revolutionary tide, my heart remained devoted to Mao and the path
of idealism along which he directed us. I hiked from Guangzhou to Jiangxi’s
Jinggang Mountains (2) during the Cultural Revolution’s Great Link-up Cam-
paign, (3) and while working in a production brigade in the countryside, I
hiked from Beijing to Shanxi’s Qin County. This should be considered a re-
sponse to the revolutionary fervour Chairman Mao kindled in me; however
difficult or tiring, it seemed bold and heroic. Our generation modelled its
actions on stories of the Red Army’s Long March heard since childhood.
At that time, propaganda proclaimed the three historical milestones of
Marxism as Marx’s founding of scientific socialism, Lenin’s construction of
a socialist state, and Mao Zedong’s solution to the restoration of capitalism
once the proletariat seized power. This theory, known as sustained revolution
under proletarian dictatorship, was at that time enthralling and a source of
pride for all Chinese, and I likewise accepted it without reservation. After
1969, when I was transformed from Beijing high school student to rusticated
intellectual youth, the harsh reality of my living conditions began to chal-
lenge the internal consistency of my world view. At that time, all levels of
the government regularly convened assemblies to “integrate learning and
practical application” of Mao Zedong Thought (4) as a means of promoting
day-to-day work. But I was put off by the exaggeration and hypocrisy of
the speeches. I recall a model opera at that time called “Taking Tiger Moun-
tain by Strategy,” which included a line that became popular doggerel:
“What kind of horse is it? A horse whose rump is patted. What kind of knife
is it? A knife stabbed in another’s back.” This summarised the political at-
mosphere of that time. For that reason, in the latter stage of my time in
the production brigade, my propensity for frank talk caused friction with
local cadres, and I barely escaped being arrested and made into an exam-
ple.
The “September 13 Incident” of 1971 (5) smashed the foundation of Mao’s
personality cult. In the public’s mind, Lin Biao was the ultimate disciple and
standard-bearer of Mao Zedong Thought, as well as Mao’s closest comrade-
in-arms and successor, but he had attempted to flee China. The myth of the
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1. Translator’s note (hereafter TN): I.e., families with backgrounds as workers, poor and lower peas-
ants, revolutionary cadres, or revolutionary martyrs, as opposed to the “black categories” of land-
lords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, criminals, and capitalists.
2. TN: Renowned as the birthplace of the Red Army and the “cradle of the Chinese revolution.”
3. TN: The “Chuan Lian” movement, translated variously as “linked up,” “joining the great circuit,”
“the great exchange,” etc., was a campaign during which youths travelled across the country on
foot, in trains, and on buses to establish ties with one another and offer mutual support in the
revolutionary experience.
4. Author’s note (unless otherwise specified, all notes hereafter are author’s notes): Lin Biao proposed
that in studying Chairman Mao’s works it was necessary to “bring questions, apply learning to
practical life, integrate learning and doing, start with the knowledge most urgently needed, and
get instant results.” 
5. On 13 September 1971, Lin Biao, his wife Ye Qun, son Lin Liguo, and others attempted to escape
China by air. Their plane crashed near Ondorhaan, Mongolia, and all aboard were killed.
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all-prescient Mao was no longer sustainable. Propaganda for the Peak Theory
– that Mao Zedong Thought represented the highest plane of Marxism –
inevitably waned.  I likewise encountered and sought out philosophical and
cultural alternatives to Mao. By the latter stage of the Cultural Revolution,
what I was avidly reading was no longer the regime’s mainstream propa-
ganda, but rather the gray and yellow-covered books (6) of the pre-Cultural
Revolution era, as well as publications circulated internally during the Cul-
tural Revolution. Books such as The Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev and Milo-
van Djilas’s The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System had an
enormous impact on my thinking.
Social reality also made me aware of how the targets of Mao’s sustained
revolution diverged from actual public sentiment. The cadres attacked and
purged in the latter stages of the Cultural Revolution, in campaigns such as
those to criticise Lin Biao and Confucius and to “criticise Deng Xiaoping and
the Right-Deviationist Wind of Reversing Verdicts,” were not necessarily
those who had aroused the greatest popular antipathy. Nor did the officials
who had most harmed the interests of the masses seem to be the targets
of these movements. The revolution Mao mobilised no longer coincided to
any significant degree with the sources of real popular discontent. Further-
more, too many of those who answered Mao’s call to charge the enemy
lines in repeated political campaigns also became sacrificial victims. By the
time Mao died, his glorious aura had already substantially diminished in my
mind.
The stage of reflection
Beginning with the latter stage of the Mao era, I experienced many polit-
ical movements, and my attempts to preserve my own viewpoint inevitably
caused me grief. After the Gang of Four was smashed, the purge of Gang
associates in Shanxi led to the rise of one faction to purge another. At that
time, I was working in the investigation and research office of the Shanxi
provincial Party committee. The office, headed by Wu Xiang, (7) became a
prime target for purging after being labelled a “Petöfi Club” (8) by provincial
Party secretary Wang Qian, who was backed by Chen Yonggui. (9) During this
purge, I personally experienced the ruthlessness, mercilessness, and utter ir-
rationality of internal Party struggle, and the perversity of the official mind-
set. Although I narrowly escaped a second demotion to menial labour by
taking the autumn 1977 college entrance examination, this encounter im-
pelled me toward further reflection.
After beginning my studies at Shanxi University in spring 1978, I naturally
became a sympathiser with Beijing’s Democracy Wall and university student
elections. I also became involved with several student publications at the
university. The emancipated thinking of the top leadership at that time did
not last long; in spring 1979, Deng Xiaoping gave his speech insisting on the
Four Cardinal Principles (10) and arrested Wei Jingsheng, (11) signifying the end
of the brief honeymoon Deng had enjoyed with China’s intelligentsia and
those outside the system who were calling for democracy and freedom. This
was the end of the ascendency China’s intellectuals had enjoyed, and they
entered an era of political chess between left and right. My thinking and
sentiment consistently inclined toward what officialdom regarded as bour-
geois liberalisation, even more so after I abandoned politics for scholarly
pursuits in the mid-1980s. My reflections on Mao also unfolded along sev-
eral directions. After the 1989 June 4th Incident, this process gained depth.
I first began to reflect on the repeated political campaigns led by the CCP,
not merely after but already before the founding of the PRC. Many facts
not previously encountered or understood were first broached in scar liter-
ature (12) and reflection literature, after which I read memoirs of the people
involved and treatises by researchers, which made me see the ruthless as-
pect of Mao’s revolution and the CCP’s history.
My second line of reflection focused on the International Communist
Movement, which revealed to me the bloodbath behind the scenes, from
the Soviet Union to Eastern Europe, and from Stalin to Lenin. By choosing
the road from Lenin to Stalin, Mao did not take the right path toward human
civilisation, but rather veered off on the wrong path toward Utopia. The ide-
ological framework of the Five Stage Theory of history and historical mate-
rialism established from Marx to Stalin to Mao was a subjective fabrication.
From Stalin to Mao, this thought system became policy; in domestic politics
people were branded as enemies, and some designated as landlords, rich
peasants, or capitalists were stripped of their economic assets and physically
exterminated, inflicting grievous internal injury on Chinese society. The
changes brought about by China’s implementation of market economics
exposed the failure of the socialist experiment established on the founda-
tion of Marx’s surplus value doctrine, which negated the market and capi-
talism and abolished exploitation. Mao’s “May 7 Road” (13) was not a
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6. In the 1960s, a series of books were published in China under restricted circulation, their back
covers stamped with the words “for internal reference.” These were meant as reference materials
for the senior leadership and academic theorists to criticise revisionism. Among them, books of
political theory had gray covers, and were referred to as “gray-covered books,” while literary works
had yellow covers and were referred to as “yellow-covered books.”
7. Wu Xiang, born in 1921, was a native of Anhui who served as deputy Party secretary and director
of the policy survey and research room of the Shanxi provincial Party committee, as well as deputy
director of the State Council’s Rural Development Research Centre and other posts.
8. Named after the revolutionary poet Sandor Petöfi, Hungary’s Petöfi Club was established in 1954
as a cultural organisation under the leadership of the Hungarian Workers Youth League. It became
more active in 1956 and sponsored a series of seminars on ideological emancipation, discussing
economics, philosophy, history, news media, and other such issues, eventually influencing Hun-
gary’s political progress. It was stamped out during the Soviet suppression of the 1956 Hungarian
Uprising.
9. Chen Yonggui (14 February 1915 - 26 March 1986) served at one point as branch Party secretary
of Dazhai, Shanxi Province. In 1973 he was elected to the standing committee of the CCP Central
Committee Politburo, and in 1975 he served as vice-premier of the State Council of the PRC. He
resigned in 1980.
10. During a Party conference to discuss ideological guidelines on 30 March 1979, Deng Xiaoping
proposed maintaining the socialist road, the dictatorship of the proletariat (i.e., the people’s dem-
ocratic dictatorship), the leadership of the Communist Party, and Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong
Thought as the “four cardinal principles.”
11. Wei Jingsheng was a worker in Beijing who posted on the Xidan Democracy Wall an essay pro-
posing political democratisation as the fifth modernisation, and warning of the possibility of Deng
Xiaoping becoming a new dictator. The CCP leadership sentenced him to 14 years in prison.
12. Scar literature is a literary trend that started in mainland China at the end of the 1970s. It focused on
showing the harm inflicted on the Chinese people by the Cultural Revolution and other political move-
ments. The trend’s name derived from a short story by the Shanghai writer Lu Xinhua entitled “Scar.”
13. On 7 May 1966, Mao Zedong wrote the following letter to Lin Biao:
Comrade Lin Biao: I received the general logistics department report that you sent on 6 May, and
I feel this plan is very good. Would it be possible to distribute this report to all military regions
and ask them to convene meetings of corps- and division-level cadres to discuss it, and report
their views to the Military Commission? Then the report can be approved by the Central Com-
mittee, followed by appropriate directives to the entire military establishment. Please decide on
this. As long as there is no world war, the army should be a big university; even if there is a Third
World War, it’s quite possible for it to become this kind of big university, in which all kinds of work
can be done apart from fighting. Isn’t that what we did in all of the anti-Japanese base areas
during the eight years of the Second World War? In this big university, people can study politics,
military affairs, and culture. They can also engage in agricultural sideline production. They could
also operate some small to medium-sized factories to manufacture certain products they need
as well as items that can be provided to the state in an equal value exchange. They can also un-
dertake mass work and take part in the socialist education movement’s “four clean-ups” campaign
in the factories and villages. When the socialist education movement is finished, there is always
other mass work to be done to ensure that the military and the people remain integrated. They
should also regularly participate in Cultural Revolution struggles criticising the bourgeoisie. In this
way, military training, war agriculture, war industry, and soldier-civilian unity can be combined.
But this requires appropriate deployment, with one unit engaging in only one or two of the mass,
agricultural, industrial, or civilian activities, not all at the same time. In this way, an army of several
million can be enormously effective.
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blueprint for the society of the future, but rather a mutation of agricultural
socialism.
My third reflection was on China’s history, from the First Emperor Qin Shi-
huang to Liu Bang, Zhu Yuanzhang, and Hong Xiuquan; (14) it revealed Mao’s
connection to China’s tradition of imperial rule and peasant rebellion, and
revealed to me Mao’s cultural origins. 
During the Mao era, propaganda declared that two-thirds of the world’s
people lived in an abyss of misery, and that the people of China were the
most fortunate. It was only after my generation had the opportunity to un-
derstand the situation outside of China that this illusion was dramatically
dispelled. The demonised Euro-American nations were not only materially
prosperous and economically flourishing, but were also endowed with ad-
vanced science and education and generous social welfare systems. In par-
ticular, their system of democratic constitutionalism, which controlled the
power of officials and restrained privilege and corruption, bestowed on their
citizens a life of dignity. From the end of the Second World War until the
early 1950s, Japan, Korea, and other Asian nations, along with the Taiwan
region, had similar or even inferior living standards to that of mainland
China. By the time of Mao’s death, however, Japan and the Four Little Drag-
ons of Asia had soared economically to join the ranks of the developed
world. This contrast was not a historical inevitability, but rather resulted
from the Mao’s erroneous choices.
As a result of my reflections, I chose to bid farewell to Mao Zedong and
to rejoin mainstream human civilisation and universal values.
Empirical research
Since entering the new millennium, the best interests of the Chinese peo-
ple have diversified, as have their values, and views of Mao Zedong are also
undergoing a diversification process. There is no longer a consensus on Mao
in China, with a very broad spectrum existing between wholesale endorse-
ment and thorough negation.
Those who endorse Mao include old Leftists, who maintain a wholesale
allegiance to the Leninist-Stalinist-Maoist system and to the ideology of
Mao’s last years. They believe that China’s current system is one of revi-
sionism and restoration of capitalism, and that the proper path would be
to negate Deng Xiaoping, with some even advocating a reversal of the
verdicts against Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao. (15) Supporters also in-
clude grassroots factions with populist tendencies, who believe that Mao
represents egalitarianism, the workers and peasants, and the poor. They
use Mao as their rallying point in calling for another revolution to punish
official corruption, wipe out the wealthy, and aid the indigent. Another
portion consists of former members of the Cultural Revolution’s rebel fac-
tion, whose ideological and sentimental reference is the early years of the
Cultural Revolution, and who recall with nostalgia the brief honeymoon
period of Mao and the rebel faction. All of these viewpoints can be easily
found represented on websites such as Utopia. (16) There is also a portion
made up of statists fixated on opposing imperialism and Western hege-
mony. They applaud Mao’s daring to stand up to the Great Powers and
battle hegemonism and his refusal to “hide one’s strength and bide one’s
time” (tao guang yang hui), but fall short of a wholesale endorsement of
Mao’s domestic agenda. These various Maoist factions are not genuine
fundamentalists; most pick and choose the ideological aspects that suit
their practical needs. It is evident, however, from more than 10,000 post-
ings on the Internet against criticism of Mao by scholar Mao Yushi that
this ideological trend has a definite mass foundation and substantial social
capacity.
The mainstream authorities, well aware that Mao is the progenitor of the
Chinese Communist Party and of the People’s Republic of China, and is
therefore both China’s Lenin and its Stalin, are prevented from casting aside
Mao’s banner lest both Party and nation lose their legitimacy. Deng Xiaoping
dissected Mao’s banner and the errors of Mao’s last years in the form of the
“Resolution Regarding Certain Historical Issues since the Founding of the
PRC.” (17) Today’s leaders continue to maintain this stand. Recently, numerous
images of Mao, Deng, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao were shipped to Tibet in
order to counter the influence of the Dalai Lama. (18) The “red song” cam-
paign in Chongqing not so long ago was also an attempt to cash in on Mao’s
political capital. (19) Even so, the leadership’s endorsement of Mao is a matter
of pragmatism. Mao-era economic and social policies cannot benefit the
current leadership and have therefore been revised or abandoned.
Opposition to Mao likewise has different aspects and levels. Some oppo-
nents date their negation to the Cultural Revolution, and others to the CCP’s
Eighth Party Congress. (20) Some reject Mao but endorse the Communist-led
revolution. Some reject Stalin but endorse Lenin. Some reject Lenin but pre-
serve Marx. Some feel that the entire Communist Movement was a wrong
turn in the history of civilisation. For example, Zhu Houze, who at one time
served as head of the CCP Central Committee Propaganda Department, car-
ried out a comparison of four political thought trends with worldwide in-
fluence and negated Leninism and Fascism. (21)
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Likewise with workers, they are mainly engaged in industry, but at the same time they should
also take part in military affairs, politics, and culture as well as the “four clean-ups,” and in criti-
cising the bourgeoisie. Where conditions allow, they should also engage in agricultural sideline
production, for example in the Daqing oil fields.
Peasants engage mainly in agriculture (including forestry, herding, sideline production, and fish-
eries), but should also learn military affairs, politics, culture, and where conditions allow also par-
ticipate in setting up collective small factories, as well as criticising the bourgeoisie.
It’s the same for students, who mainly study, but at the same time learn non-academic subjects
such as industry, agriculture, and military affairs, while also criticising the bourgeoisie. The educa-
tional system must be reduced; education must be revolutionised. The phenomenon of bourgeois
intellectuals dominating our schools cannot continue.
Commerce, service industries, and staff of the administrative units of the Party and government
must do likewise, conditions allowing.
There is nothing new or creative in any of the above; many people have been doing this for years
already, it just hasn’t become universal. As for the army, it has already been doing this for decades,
but now it’s time to develop it further.
This letter subsequently came to be referred to as the “May 7 Directive.” The practice of people
in different trades learning each others’ occupations and for cadres, students, and intellectuals to
go down to the countryside for agricultural service became known as the “May 7 Road.”
14. Liu Bang was the founding emperor of the Han Dynasty; Zhu Yuanzhang was the founding emperor
of the Ming dynasty; Hong Xiuquan was the leader of the Taiping Rebellion. All are considered
representative of peasant rebellions in China’s history.
15. TN: Zhang Chunqiao (1917-2005) was a political theorist and member of the Gang of Four.
16. TN: Wuyou zhi xiang, www.wyzxsx.com. The website became disabled around the time of the Bo
Xilai scandal in Chongqing in April 2012.
17. “Resolution Regarding Certain Historical Issues since the Founding of the PRC” (passed unani-
mously during the sixth plenum of the CCP’s Eleventh Central Committee on 27 June, 1981),
http://www.cctv.com/special/733/-1/47008.html (consulted on 19 April 2012).
18. The unveiling of leader portraits and flag-raising ceremony by the Tibet Autonomous Region Party
committee and government was attended by TAR Party secretary Chen Quanguo. See Tibet Daily,
24 January 2012.
19. TN: The campaign was launched by Chongqing Party secretary Bo Xilai in 2011 to mark the 90th
anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. See Barbara Demick, “’Red song’
campaign in China strikes some false notes,” Los Angeles Times, 3 June 2011, http://articles.la-
times.com/2011/jun/03/world/la-fg-china-red-20110604 (consulted on 19 April 2012).
20. TN: The disastrous Great Leap Forward was launched in December 1957 during the Eighth Party
Congress, which was the first Congress following the founding of the PRC.
21. Zhu Houze, “Dangjin wenhua jiaolü wenti” (The current problem of cultural anxiety), Yanhuang
Chunqiu, no.  10, 2010.
Ding Dong – Worship, Reflection, Empirical Research: My Mao Zedong Trilogy
My own inclination is to employ empirical research to restore Mao’s true
historical features. Given the fact that high-level archives remain confiden-
tial, this is very difficult work that can only be performed slowly and pa-
tiently. There is no essential conflict between empirical research and
reflection. Empirical research, however, is characterised by a sober and ob-
jective attempt to clarify the truth, rather than a self-referential expression
of personal feelings. 
For example, one question worthy of empirical research is whether Mao
had a Party-based or family-based conception of succession of power. Party-
based succession, maintaining one-party dictatorship, presupposes Party
rule of the nation, with succession decided within the Party leadership rather
than passed to a member of Mao’s family. Up until the collapse of the Soviet
and Eastern European regimes in the late 1980s and early 1990s, most
countries in the International Communist Movement implemented this kind
of system. Under family-based succession, the highest authority is passed
to an offspring, sibling, or spouse. A minority of countries in the International
Communist Movement have implemented this kind of system. For example,
in North Korea, rule has passed through three generations from Kim Il-sung
to Kim Jong-il to Kim Jong-un, with no compunction against implementing
a so-called “Communist hereditary system.” In Cuba, Fidel Castro was suc-
ceeded by his younger brother Raul. Romania’s Nicolae Ceausescu served
as party leader and head of state, while his wife Elena served as second-in-
command of the party, and his son Nicu served as first general secretary of
the Communist Youth League, in preparation for family-based succession.
This plan was brought to ruin, however, with the overthrow of the Ceausescu
regime in 1989.
In China’s recorded history, the ancient dynasties all implemented fam-
ily-based succession. In 1912, the Qing emperor abdicated, and the Republic
of China was born, its president elected by ballot. The first president, Yuan
Shikai, in his later years restored the monarchy, intending succession to be
handed to his son, but abandoned his plan upon encountering intense pop-
ular opposition. Chiang Kai-shek’s wielding of state power in Taiwan was
passed to his son, Chiang Ching-kuo. In his later years, however, Chiang
Ching-kuo abolished martial law and lifted the ban against opposition par-
ties, ending the claims of the Chiang dynasty. In the present world, some
democratic countries still maintain hereditary kingship. Because they im-
plement constitutional monarchy, however, kingship has acquired a cere-
monial status that does not confer ultimate power over the country; actual
national authority is held by parliament and government, which are elected
by popular ballot. This does not constitute family-based rule. Whether Mao’s
actual intention was for Party-based succession or family-based succession
remains a topic of controversy in China’s scholarly community.
A few years ago, the scholar Xin Ziling published a book entitled The Set-
ting of the Red Sun: Mao’s Lasting Merits and Demerits, (22) which held that
Mao intended for his wife Jiang Qing to succeed him in ruling China, and
which gave credence to rumours that Mao had produced and left behind
name lists of cabinet officials. Xin believes that Mao’s intention upon his
death was that Jiang Qing should become Party chairman, or that Jiang
should assist Mao Yuanxin’s “ascent to the throne.” (23) Since such authori-
tative figures as Li Rui and Xie Tao (24) wrote forewords to the book, it has
been highly influential. Up to the present, many scholars believe that Mao
intended to hand his power to Jiang Qing.
If Mao did intend to arrange for Jiang Qing or Mao Yuanxin to succeed
him, this would of course qualify as family-based succession. The tenability
of this claim must nevertheless be judged by fact rather than through emo-
tion. Yan Changgui and Yang Yinlu published an article in Yanhuang Chun-
qiu (25) laying out testimony they obtained from Mao Yuanxin, Zhang
Yufeng, (26) and others. I feel their article is credible, while the various ru-
moured cabinet lists in which Mao named Jiang Qing Party chairman are
not credible.
Based on publicly accessible historical materials, it is a fact that Mao
groomed his son, Mao Anying, as his successor. At Yan’an, he had Mao Anying
emulate the model farmer Wu Manyou, and also had Kang Sheng, Tian Ji-
aying, Zeng Yanxiu, (27) and others teach his son about China’s history and
culture and take him to participate in land reform. After the establishment
of the PRC, Mao had Mao Anying serve in a leadership capacity at a Beijing
factory, and also sent him with Peng Dehuai (28) to fight for North Korea. All
this can be regarded as Mao providing his son with comprehensive political
training. This plan was terminated, however, when the younger Mao was
killed in the Korean War. Mao Zedong exclaimed, “Is the creator of bad
precedent to be left without posterity?” (29)
Subsequently, although others in Mao’s family, including Jiang Qing, Mao
Yuanxin, and Li Na, (30) were appointed to relatively important positions,
there is no irrefutable evidence that Mao wanted them to succeed him.
From the Ninth Party Congress until 1976, others repeatedly proposed that
Jiang Qing be made a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, but
Mao consistently refused. Neither did Mao put Jiang in charge of any con-
crete operations. Mao knew that Jiang had many enemies and that she
would be unable to maintain control of the central government. For that
reason, up until his death he never gave her any opportunity to manage
daily operations in the central government. Mao Yuanxin had very strong
administrative abilities; Mao Zedong treated him like a son, and during the
Cultural Revolution, Zhou Enlai repeatedly arranged for the younger Mao
to be put to good use in important postings. Just before the Ninth National
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22. Xin Ziling, Hong taiyang de yunluo: qian qiu gongzui Mao Zedong (The setting of the red sun:
Mao’s lasting merits and demerits), Hong Kong, Shu zuofang chubanshe, 2007.
23. Mao Yuanxin, born in 1941, was the son of Mao Zedong’s younger brother Mao Zemin. During
the Cultural Revolution he served as vice-chairman of the Liaoning Provincial Revolutionary Com-
mittee, Party secretary of the Liaoning provincial Party committee, and political commissar of
the Shenyang Military Region. From the end of 1975 to 1976 he served as liaison between Mao
Zedong and the Central Committee Politburo. He was arrested in October 1976 and subsequently
sentenced to 17 years in prison. He was released on medical parole in 1989, and completed his
sentence in 1993, after which he worked as an engineering technician in Shanghai. He is now re-
tired.
24. TN: Li Rui (1917- ) served as Mao’s personal secretary in the 1950s. Xie Tao (1922-2010) was a
veteran Party member and scholar.
25. Yan Changgui, Yang Yinlu, “Yi ze lishi chuanwen de zhen wei” (Fact and fiction behind a historical
rumour), Yanhuang Chunqiu, no. 3, 2010.
26. Zhang Yufeng, born in 1944, a native of Heilongjiang, served as Mao Zedong’s confidential and
personal secretary from 1970 onward.
27. Kang Sheng (1898 - 16 December 1975), a native of Jiao County, Shandong Province, served as
vice-chairman of the CCP Central Committee and as vice-chairman of the standing committee
of the National People’s Congress. His Party membership was rescinded after his death. Tian Jiaying
(1922 - 1966), a native of Chengdu, Sichuan Province, served as vice-director of the CCP Central
Committee Political Research Room and of the CCP Central Committee General Office. He com-
mitted suicide at the outset of the Cultural Revolution. Zeng Yanxiu, a native of Yibin, Sichuan
Province, born in 1919, served as publisher and chief editor of the People’s Publishing House.
28. Peng Dehuai (1898 - 1974), a native of Xiangtan, Hunan Province, was Marshall of the PRC. He
served as the PRC’s Defence Minister and as commander-in-chief of the Chinese People’s Volunteer
Army.
29. At the Lushan Conference on 23 July 1959, Mao said, “The creator of bad precedent is left with
no posterity. Have I no posterity? According to Chinese custom, only male offspring count as pos-
terity, not female offspring. My one son was killed and another went mad, so I consider myself to
have no posterity.”
30. Li Na, born in 1940, was the daughter of Mao and Jiang Qing. At the outset of the Cultural Revo-
lution she served as head of the editorial guidance committee of PLA Daily, and from 1974 to
1975 she served first as secretary of the Pinggu county Party committee and deputy secretary of
the Beijing municipal Party committee.
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Party Congress, Mao Zedong gave instruction that neither Mao Yuanxin nor
Li Na was suitable to serve as a delegate. (31) Likewise during the Tenth Party
Congress Mao didn’t allow Yuanxin to join the Central Committee. If Mao
had intended for him to be his successor, he would not have blocked Yuanxin
from joining the Central Committee. Up to the present, therefore, none of
the publicly accessible reliable historical documentation provides sufficient
proof that Mao planned for family-based succession. 
Whether in his selection of Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, Wang Hongwen, Deng Xi-
aoping, Hua Guofeng, or other successors, Mao’s intentions fell under the
scope of Party-based succession. Lin Biao’s succession was written into the
Party constitution approved during the Ninth Party Congress. Five years
passed from the time of Lin Biao’s death in the September 13 Incident until
Mao’s death. In accordance with Mao’s wishes, the CCP Central Committee’s
daily operations were managed by four different people in succession: Zhou
Enlai, Wang Hongwen, Deng Xiaoping, and Hua Guofeng. Others Mao may
have considered as possible successors include Zhang Chunqiao, Ji Dengkui,
and Li Desheng. 
Official propaganda typically highlights the legitimacy of whoever is in
power. When Hua Guofeng took power, the propaganda emphasised Mao’s
trust in Hua. When Deng Xiaoping took power, the emphasis was on Mao’s
appreciation of Deng. Independent historians are able to see beyond the
official propaganda. The book Unsustainable Sustained Revolution by Shi
Yun and Li Danhui, (32) for example, considers the choice of successors in
Mao’s later years, with analysis of Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Wang Hong-
wen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Hua Guofeng. The authors find that
while Mao was dissatisfied with Zhou, he found him indispensible. When
Zhou died before Mao, this succession option vanished. Wang Hongwen was
a Liu Penzi type; (33) Mao at one point held out some hope for him and gave
him a try, but when Wang proved unequal to the task, Mao gave up on him.
Mao had no doubts of Deng Xiaoping’s abilities, and put him in charge for
a period of time in 1975. Mao perceived, however, that Deng intended to
negate the Cultural Revolution. Mao considered the Cultural Revolution one
of the two great accomplishments of his life; to negate the Cultural Revo-
lution would be to negate half of himself. He therefore launched the cam-
paign to criticise Deng and beat back the Right-deviationist Wind of
Reversing Verdicts, causing Deng to fall from power once again.
Shi Yun and Li Danhui write, “From the perspective of consolidating the
Cultural Revolution, Mao’s most appropriate successor was Zhang Chun-
qiao.” (34) Gao Wenqian says that Zhang Chunqiao “was a true disciple of the
ideology of Mao’s later years.” (35) Zhang was in fact the faithful torch-bearer
of Mao’s ideology of sustained revolution under the dictatorship of the pro-
letariat. However, Lin Biao and then Kang Sheng raised objections to Zhang
Chunqiao, and during the second plenum of the Ninth Central Committee,
numerous members and alternate members of the Central Committee ex-
pressed their dislike of Zhang, leaving Mao with no alternative but to aban-
don his plans to pass supreme power to him. After Zhou Enlai died in January
1976, Mao had Mao Yuanxin pass on the message, “Tell Wang Hongwen and
Zhang Chunqiu to hold back.” He proposed Hua Guofeng to serve as Premier
and convenor of the Central Committee Politburo. Although Mao in his de-
clining years was obliged to assign management of the Central Committee’s
day-to-day operations to someone who was acceptable to everyone and
who was also a beneficiary of the Cultural Revolution, when he in April 1976
took the next step of appointing Hua first vice-chairman of the Central
Committee and State Council Premier, it could hardly be said that he had
no intention of passing his authority to Hua. Therefore, the result of Mao’s
actual political actions undeniably qualifies as Party-based succession.
There are many other Mao-related topics presenting considerable schol-
arly leeway for empirical research. Nanjing University professor Gao Hua
can be considered a pioneer in this area. His book How the Red Sun Rose (36)
received a positive reception in academic circles for its combing of sound
historical data. Gao’s unfortunate passing last year raised expressions of
grief and tribute from all quarters. This shows a genuine demand among
readers for serious and solid empirical research. I will continue my own ef-
forts in this area.
z Translated from Chinese by Stacy Mosher
z Ding Dong, a scholar, was born in 1951 and now lives in Beijing. He is
the author of Long Musings on a Winter’s Night (Dong ye chang kao),
Conversations with Friends (He youren duihua), Priceless Honour
(Zunyan wujia), Browsing at Midnight (Wuye fanshu), Mental Exercise
(Sixiang caolian), Spiritual Wanderings ( Jingshen liulang), A Record of
Education Speeches ( Jiaoyu fangyan lu), and Cultural Decameron
(Wenhua shiritan), and is currently focusing his research on the his-
tory and culture of modern China.
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